Pattern of identity innovation : an emancipatory potential by TODD, Jennifer
 SPS 2016/ 2 Department of Political and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patterns of Identity Innovation: An Emancipatory 
Potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer Todd 
 
European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patterns of Identity Innovation: An Emancipatory Potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer Todd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUI Working Paper SPS 2016/2 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Author(s)/editor(s), 2016 
 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
 
Abstract 
 
Everyday identity innovation is an important dimension of social change. It is at once personal and 
socially patterned. This working paper introduces the concept of identity innovation, proposes a 
typology of its patterns and shows that it provides a useful analytic tool in discussion of social 
division, conflict and conflict transformation. The argument is general, but builds on a range of micro- 
level studies undertaken by the author and others. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Social transformations have an everyday face in individuals’ remaking of relations, 
revisioning of identity, and refinding of continuities with the past. That everyday face – I call 
it ‘identity innovation’ – comes in differing sequences. Marx saw it as contemporaneous with 
revolutionary praxis: ‘the coincidence of self-change and changing circumstances’ – and this 
idea has informed much social movement study.1   It may also proceed out of phase with 
political change as a current in everyday life that produces secularization or new religious 
expressions (Ganiel 2016 ), everyday feminism and gender-egalitarian relations (Mansbridge 
and Flaster, 2007), or non-movement change in authoritarian regimes (Bayat, 2010 ). There 
are periods and places where it is ubiquitous, and places and periods where it is forced 
underground: Birtek ( 2007, p 34) describes the end of the Ottoman empire in Turkey (1912- 
22) as a time of rapid and radical individual repositioning, shut down by 1925; Polonskey 
( nd ) describes a ferment of ideas and identity formation in the varied Jewish responses to 
modernity in 19th century Poland; the 1960s in the West and nearly half a century later the 
Arab Spring, are also such periods of identity innovation. 
 
As the examples show, even when innovation is common it is not always transformatory, and 
the shutting down of change can be brutal. This is a weak force in opposition to political 
power and organized violence. But it can subvert informal and internalized power and change 
the habitus that reproduces it. Without such identity innovation, social movements lose their 
impetus, revolution reverts to older structures and institutions of conflict resolution are 
converted back to old modes of functioning. Thus analysis of the everyday processes of 
identity innovation is of wider social significance. Individual innovation is patterned, with 
similar choices and logics common to whole clusters of the population at particular times and 
places. Discovering the patterns of change and predictable obstacles to it shows how political 
policy can lessen the obstacles and support the patterns. 
 
The analysis is immediately relevant to what are called ‘identity conflicts’. There is a 
considerable literature on the conventional, social, discursive, often informal constitution of 
‘ethnic’ division that reveals the multiplicity of mechanisms by which some divisions become 
sedimented and institutionalized, appearing as 'givens' in social discourse, institutional practices 
and everyday interactions (Wimmer, 2013). Much current discussion focuses on the movement 
into conflict, the highlighting of oppositions, the mobilization of bias through discourse, the 
social pressures and incentives to toe the communal line. It highlights the role of political 
leaders and community activists (Skey, 2011 ; Wodak, 2015). The agency of 
ordinary citizens is less well understood, either in subverting division or in strengthening 
conflict. 
 
Individuals bypass and humanize such divisions in a multiplicity of ways, in home, work, 
neighbourhoods, leisure and politics. They do so not primarily by rejecting national or 
religious divisions but by reinterpreting them. In what follows, I show the range of ways that 
divisions can be subverted from below, not just by radical reclassifications but by subtler 
changes of meaning and value. Identity innovation frequently fails to make social impact, and 
 
 
1 McAdam et al,2001; Hobson, 2003; Melucci, 1996. Della Porta 2013, 39-69 shows such relationality not in 
movement out of conflict but into it. 
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its failure makes plausible right wing rhetoric about the inevitability of conflict and opposition. 
Some of those who support divisive and exclusionary policies are not die-hard racists but 
blocked innovators.2 The appropriate response is neither condemnation, nor attempt to convert 
them to liberal ideals, much less an acceptance of divisive identity politics. It lies 
rather in removing the social obstacles to innovation, encouraging it to go farther and in a 
direction more likely to succeed, thus working with the grain of everyday change. Identifying 
the patterns of innovation and the obstacles to it helps us to free this positive potential. 
 
In what follows, I begin with a contextual and conceptual situation of my argument, go on to 
present a general typology of trajectories of identity innovation that shows the logic of their 
functioning and their likely social impact. Then I show the relevance of this approach for 
analysis of identity conflicts. In conclusion, I return to the emancipatory thrust of the wider 
project. 
 
Context and concepts 
 
A critical interpretative approach 
 
Why move to a micro-level, interpretative analysis of identity innovation which takes 
seriously individual narratives when the tide of scholarship focuses on social cognition 
(Reicher,2012; Condor and Figgou, 2012), discursive grammars of nationality (Wodak, 
1999 ), choice within and change of classificatory schema (Chandra,2012; Wimmer, 2013; 
Roth, 2012) and social movements of collective action (Melucci, 1996; della Porta, 2013)? 
There are six reasons for the strategy adopted here. 
 
i. The logic of individual identity change is important not because it is individual, but 
because individual processes of change converge.3 Such convergent change has transformative 
potential, as Bayat (2010) has shown for ‘non-movement’ change in authoritarian regimes. 
The approach adopted here allows us to look at the logic of everyday change in analytic detail. 
It opens up empirical questions as to how far and when individual processes of rethinking 
converge, and with what social effects. 
ii. The ‘moment’ of individual rethinking and repositioning is a part of wider social 
transformation. Focussing on it allows us to analyse the beginnings and the reversals of 
change, not simply change carried through in practice.  Thus it can give insight into those who 
don’t as well as those that do change away from given divisions. 
iii. This focus allows us to grasp the normative meanings of change, the ends in view 
from the perspective of the actors themselves. It does not presuppose that norms are effective, 
but it opens the question of the role and effectiveness of normatively informed change to 
empirical investigation 
iv. Interaction creates new meanings and new logics. But to understand this we have to 
grasp the understandings and anticipations of those who interact. Even in social movements, 
where interactive processes predominate, we need to see the distinctive convergent logics of 
 
 
 
 
2  How many fall into this category is a matter for empirical research in each case. My point is that we have 
first to ask the questions  who  innovates  and  what  are the blockages?  This  working  paper  is designed  to 
provide a conceptual underpinning for such research. 
3    Bourdieu   (1977)   classically   analysed   the   unorganized   convergence   of   everyday   perceptions   and 
judgements. 
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collective identity at each level of what Melucci (1996) calls the ‘action system’ if we are to 
show the interrelations between levels. 
v. In showing the individual moment of transformation, research can also show the 
mechanisms by which this is subverted socially and sometimes reversed personally. In short, it 
lets us focus on what Claus Offe (2015 ) calls ‘traps’: in this case, social structures and 
dominant ideologies generate incentives for forms of identity innovation that are almost 
guaranteed socially to fail. 
vi. In these ways, the research strategy adopted here shows the (weak) emancipatory 
potential of everyday agency, and in so doing points to the ways that it could be made 
stronger. 
 
From classificatory struggles to everyday reinterpretations 
 
Much current sociological literature takes identity as a form of classification and shows how 
repositioning within or between given categorical schema is central to strategic alliance 
building and to the making and transformation of political and ethnic divisions.4 Here I 
distinguish between strategic choices within and between categorical schema and the process 
of identity innovation which involves reinterpretation of the meanings of these categories, 
which is necessarily an evaluative process. 5 
 
Reclassificatory struggles are important when distinctions are formally embedded in state, law 
and institutions: reclassification of caste position can provide access to Indian government 
programmes; citizenship classifications in Northern Ireland - British or Irish or both – will 
become crucial to access the EU and its programmes after Brexit. 
 
Reinterpretation is important where social divisions are at once informal and composite. 
Composite divisions occur where numerous distinctions – ethnic, religious, national, class - 
partially coincide. Then institutions in different fields express similar meanings and reinforce a 
sense of pervasive division from which individuals in the society have little prospect of exit. 
Informality – where self-assumed identity and mutual recognition is more important than formal 
ascription - gives considerable discretion of interpretation. Composite informal 
divisions characterise many ethnically divided societies (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, pp. 76, 
106; Hutchinson, 2005; Jenkins 2008) and more generally societies where legacies of past 
conquest and power are written on the landscape, in settlement patterns, and in a multitude of 
organisations and fields. In such societies, cultural cultural grammars link fields and 
categories, creating (partial) homologies between different classificatory schema, providing a 
complex web of meanings which socialised actors routinely negotiate, and defining the nodes 
on which there is sharp conflict (see Todd 2015). 
 
Composite divisions are institutionalised contingent historical products. They impact on 
individuals and social relations by generating real differences of perspective, judgement and 
valuation. Yet they are always fissile, resisting essentialist and foundationalist interpretations. 
There are constantly regenerated sites of contingency and lack of fit, where distinctions do not 
 
 
 
4 See key texts by Chandra 2012; Wimmer 2013 
5 Lamont (2000) puts meaning-making  central to her work on boundaries; for Wimmer, 2013,  meanings are 
part of his map of categories but because his major interest is in state and nation making, analysis of meaning 
is recessive in his work; Chandra, 2012, pp 109-111, includes meaning (content) as part of her mapping of 
ethnic identity but not as a defining part. 
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coincide, where the arbitrariness of claiming one big division rather than differentiating 
distinctions becomes experientially clear.6 Some of this dissonance is normative, for the norms 
generated in everyday practices often conflict with institutional imperatives and normative 
dissonance is a powerful trigger identity innovation.7 
 
Where there are composite informal divisions, identity innovation is ubiquitous. Individuals in 
such divided societies constantly reposition themselves with respect to these divisions which 
are at once imbued with personalised meaning (Cohen, 2000 ) and with internalised power 
relations (a dominant language, or cultural capital associated with one habitus). As power 
relations loosen, and legal enforcement decreases, so too does identity innovation become 
public and contestation over both the meaning and the social impact of division becomes 
general. 8 
 
This provides an everyday potential for change. It is often assumed that divisive ethnic and 
national and religious distinctions are best countered by moving away from them – by shifting 
classificatory schema, by rejecting the categories themselves, by (symbolically) eradicating 
the basis of exclusion, by becoming European or cosmopolitan rather than national. The 
rationale for this view lies in the power of discursive grammars and the increasingly well- 
documented ways that exclusivist ethnic and national meanings are mobilised in discussion 
and by elites (for this mobilisation, see Wodak, 2015; Skey, 2011; Condor and Figgou, 2012 ). 
Yet it does not follow that the best way of change is by shifting classificatory schema. This 
may be counterproductive in the case of composite divisions where schema are interrelated 
rather than discrete and where classificatory shift conceals the reproduction of meaning. As I 
argue below, in such cases shifting classificatory schema is less effective in countering 
division than reinterpreting meanings. Indeed in the hardest cases, whether the individual 
repositions within a given schema or shifts schema, considerable transformation of meaning is 
also necessary to move away from division. 
 
 
Individual identity innovation 
 
The concept of identity – the preserve of psychologists and quantitative social scientists – is 
notoriously unwieldy.9 In sociology, it has been criticised for explaining little, and for 
discouraging critical analysis of the meanings and makings of social solidarities and divisions 
(Brubaker and Cooper, 2002; Malešević, 2006). And yet the phenomena in question– the 
 
 
 
 
 
6 This liminality and these gaps increase as cultural logics diverge from social practices, and as niches of ‘in 
betweens’, ‘mixite’,' others' emerge. See Rodrigues Garcia, 2015. For liminality even in exclusivist closed 
divisions, see Sion, 2014 
7 This is the evidence from the Irish cases. Such changing understandings, expectations and identities among 
ordinary  citizens  do not need to be constant  or frequent  to have effect: one experience  can set in motion 
individual innovation and one individual can have exemplary and ripple effects. Green and Seher 2003 pp 
515-6 note the evidence that the pressure to conform dissipates with even one dissenter. 
8  For an initial mapping of boundaries (divisions) in terms of their closure or permeability and the degree of 
enforcement  of  this,  see  Lamont  and  Bail,  2005  ;  for  an  insightful  analysis  of  the  different  degrees  of 
informality in different fields of distinction-making  and its relation to inequality, see Brubaker, 2015, 19-35. 
The role of reinterpretation or reclassification will vary in the different types of case. 
9  Ashmore et al (2004) note the multiple measurable  dimensions  for each identity category, each of which 
forms the basis of a particular strand of psychological research. 
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personalised perspectives, values and relations that are linked in self-perception and other- 
ascriptions to social divisions and institutional bases – are undeniably politically important.10 
 
My approach is to focus not on identity per se, with its myriad of individual, interrelational and 
socio-collective meanings, but on the social patterning and impact of individual-level change 
away from social divisions and symbolic understandings of those divisions. When I write of 
identity innovation I mean the ways that individuals (re)position themselves with respect to 
wider social divisions, categories (Taijfel, 1981) and roles (Stryker, 2000), and conventional 
expectations and modes of ‘social cognition’ (Condor and Figgou, 2012). By social divisions, I 
intend not simply social categories but the composite social and cultural configurations that are 
expressed in categorical terms. When I write of repositioning, I do not primarily intend 
shifting self-categorisation but rather reinterpretation of the meanings that give significance to 
categories, and a related change in the individual’s mode of practical engagement with the 
social and cultural configuration. This is conceived as engagement, sustained reflection, 
exploration, commitment, practice, interaction (sustained well beyond the momentary but not 
necessarily over a significant period of months or years) (see Schwartz, 
2001). It is often expressed in narrative form that shows both continuity and change 
(Breakwell, 1996).  This conceptualization allows us to look empirically at individual identity 
innovation as meaningful, directional and as socially patterned.11 
 
Individual identity innovation is loosely analogous to firm-level innovation in economics. Just 
as firm-level innovation does not necessarily lead to growth either in the firm or in the 
economy as a whole, so identity innovation is not always sustained individually or socially. 
Indeed, unlike in the ideal market economy, power and vested interests may ensure that 
identity innovation does not spread. at the individual level or spread socially. Just as firm-level 
innovation presupposes an industry ‘frontier’ which it breaches, so identity innovation 
presupposes societies where there are discernible social practices and grammars of division 
from which it moves away. While firm innovation is normally technological or perhaps 
organizational, identity innovation can takes place on a wider range of dimensions – class, 
gender or the composite ethno-religio-national divisions in Ireland or Israel-Palestine. 
 
Identity innovation is not immediately correlated with particular political choices. However it 
orients individuals towards some choices and against others; it immunizes them against some 
forms of rhetoric and opens them to others; it lets them intuitively connect to some groups and 
mistrust others. The gap between identity innovation and political choice constitutes a section 
of the population as ‘swayers’, open to alternative arguments. In a divided society, if 
innovation remains resonant rather than radical (to use Ferree’s ( 2003   ) term) it opens 
individuals to recurrent choices between compromise and repolarisation. Such swayers are a 
crucial constituency in divided societies. 
 
Individual identity innovation is sometimes dismissed as socially unimportant. When ‘the 
chips are down’, it is said, those who innovate vote with their feet for segregation or 
exclusion; and collective and collaborative cognition often reverses processes of innovation. It 
 
 
 
10  For  an  attempt  to  break  the  paradigmatic  deadlocks  over  the  use  of  the  term  ‘identity’  and  ‘identity 
change’, see Rumelili and Todd, forthcoming 2017. 
11  In work presently being completed,  I have done this for the two parts of Ireland. This involves a multi- 
phased  process  of  analysis,  including  a  grounded  theory  identification   of  themes  in  interviews,   and 
triangulation of these interviews with other data in interpretative and contextual analysis. 
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is, however, mistaken to dismiss identity innovation as mere hypocrisy. Hypocrisy, the verbal 
affirmation of an alternative perspective while in private reaffirming the given identity,  is an 
important phenomenon but it is not the same as innovation that is later reversed (Smithey, 
2011). The distinction is important for comparative and policy purposes, just as it is important 
to see what types of innovation are most vulnerable to reversal. 
 
 
 
Typology of identity innovation 
 
In the literature on ethnicity, identity change is normally seen as a mode of repositioning 
within a given set of categories or a changing of classificatory schema. I argue below that this 
limits our potential to grasp change in situations of composite division and instead suggest a 
typology of modes of reinterpretation, based not simply on changing classification but also on 
changing rules, meaning, argumentation and directionality.12 
 
Repositioning within a given classificatory schema 
 
Repositioning has been analysed logically by Chandra (2012).  This form of change is most 
likely when there is a high authoritative ascription of classificatory schema and clear rules of 
reference within – when the schema have official, quasi-legal force. 
 
On Chandra’s analysis, the individual’s choices are normally limited by the given classificatory 
schema (the range and relation of categories in a particular field), the attribute schema (the 
range and relation of properties necessary to make a meaningful claim to category 
membership), the rules linking attributes and categories (the parameters of reference of the 
categories) (Chandra, 2012, pp. 105-109, 132-5 ). Repositioning is thus possible within the 
rules of the schema, limited by the attributes that the individual possesses or can attain.13 In 
turn, each set of categories bounds a given class membership. Category shift always involves a 
different, larger or smaller, class membership. When it happens collectively, it is a product of 
brokerage and interest, and it may involve revaluation (Wimmer, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 This echoes Wodak’s insistence on the need to distinguish themes, syntactic modes, and topoi. 
13 There are also interlinkages between classificatory (categorical and attribute) schema such that there is an 
enormous amount of potential identity categories, interlinked in a complex web of partial homology and 
intertranslatability  (eg 158) and over time the rules change (eg p. 169). But Chandra’s  central focus is on 
individual repositioning in terms of the existing rules. 
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Table 1: Repositioning in a given schema 
 
General 
mechanis 
m 
Empi 
rical 
types 
Categories and attributes Epistemology 
, ontology 
Values Costs and 
benefits, 
Sustainab 
ility and 
impact 
Shifting 
self within 
given 
schema. 
High 
authoritati 
ve 
ascription; 
low 
discretion 
of 
interpreta 
tion of 
meaning 
No change 
of the 
‘rules’ 
only of the 
individual 
within 
them. 
Tradi 
tional 
conve 
rsion 
in a 
dyadi 
c 
classif 
icaton 
schem 
a 
Content and categories and 
valuation reversed within 
given (oppositional) 
classificatory schema which 
remains unchanged. Attributes 
changed to permit this. 
Classic religious conversion. 
Certainty – 
embracement of convert 
role 
Particular values of new 
tradition embraced (old 
overturned). 
Transvaluation 
Costs: Loss of roots and 
old networks 
Benefits: gain of new 
networks 
Individually sustainable, 
but no impact on  social 
division. 
Repos 
itioni 
ng 
amon 
g 
plural 
categ 
ories, 
fissio 
n or 
fusion 
. 
Movement within a given set 
of categories. 
Early 20th century redefinition 
of Irish Unionists as Ulster 
Unionists. Late 20th century 
shift from Ulster and Irish to 
British self-reported identity. 
Repositioning on a racial 
continuum (da Silva and Reis, 
2012). 
Strategic self-interest 
Revaluation (movement 
to higher status 
category). 
Benefits are primarily 
strategic: identifying 
with bigger, or smaller 
group. Older identity 
categories may remain 
recessive, and networks 
still extant. 
 
Conversion (Snow and Machelek, 1984) is a radical form of individual change particularly so 
when the classificatory schema is dyadic and the individual moves from one side to the other. 
This may require considerable remaking of individual attributes, whether in the form of 
religious learning, or of ethno-national resocialisation. Other forms of repositioning are 
possible between different classificatory levels: shifting upwards to more general or 
downwards to more particular categories thereby (if the move is general) permitting strategic 
redrawing of group boundaries sometimes without any necessary change of attributes.14 
 
Where repositioning is individual, it does not change boundaries (Barth, 1969). Where it is 
convergent it does. Mass conversions, language change that underlies nationality shift, 
redrawing of group boundaries, take cascade-like form since, once a threshold point is 
reached, it becomes in the interest of all to follow and not to be left as a marginalized minority 
(Laitin, 1998). 
 
This way of conceiving change leaves rules untouched, changing only in the long term, and 
meanings unanalyzed. Yet as Wimmer (2013, pp 50-63) points out, repositioning may also 
 
 
 
14 Wimmer, 2013, 73, calls this shifting topography, as distinct from changing meaning 
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involves assertion of new meanings and values and may bring more change in rules than is 
allowed on the model above. So for example, a slight change of attributes (an individual’s 
change of name or of self-presentation,) may allow double-inclusion in previously exclusive 
categories (Irish and Nigerian) thus implicitly changing exclusivist categories to plural and 
compatible ones.15 Repositionings often involve the creation of new linkages across previously 
separated groups, and the correlative revision of ‘group narratives’ (Ashmore et al 2004  ). In 
some cases – Roy (2013 , 178 ) mentions conversions to new religions in North Africa – they 
have transformative impact, introducing unexpected resonances and meanings, cutting 
anticipated linkages between fields, and thus functioning as  a mode of destructuration and 
modernization of traditional societies. For these reasons, repositioning can be seen as a special 
case in the broader context of reinterpretation of rules and meanings. 
 
Switching between given ‘set package’ classificatory schema 
 
This requires that discrete classificatory schema and related authority-structures are available. 
It has been discussed most usefully in studies of migration (Roth, 2012; Waters 1999, 62-3). 
Roth has outlined how shifting takes place between the dyadic racial schema used in the USA 
and a more complex plural racial schema in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, each 
with differential degrees of exclusivity, and different relations to national and other fields. 
Such situational shifting to and fro between extant schema – Waters notes it happens several 
times in one day – can have lasting effect. Roth argues that it has transformed the once-dyadic 
US racial schema. 
 
Shifting can also take place between fields, where the schema are kept discrete and the shift 
represents a lasting commitment. According to Weber (1976) a mass change from a class to a 
national schema occurred in the late 19th century as peasants became French. In this case the 
topography and the politics of difference changes. 
 
Distinct from the socially transformatory shifts discussed above is the everyday and constant 
situational shifting between classificatory schema used in differing fields – what Goffman 
(1959) called the presentation of self in daily life  - which allows for flexibility in 
interrelations while for the most part leaving the existing schema untouched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 For other examples drawing on the migrant experience, see Levitt, 2005; Bursell, 2012. 
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Table 2: Switching between classificatory schema 
 
General 
mechanis 
m 
Empi 
rical 
types 
Categories 
and 
attributes 
Grammar Ontology, 
epistemology 
Values Costs and 
benefits, 
Sustainab 
ility and 
impact 
Shifting 
classificat 
ory 
schema 
(assumes a 
choice of 
authoritati 
ve discrete 
schema). 
Shifti 
ng 
withi 
n 
fields 
to 
altern 
ative 
schem 
a 
Situational shifting between 
different racial schema, for 
example by migrants.. 
Situational shift in 
values. Cultural 
relativism 
Significant benefits in 
flexibility and 
negotiability of relations 
and with possible over 
time impact. 
Shifti 
ng 
sidew 
ays 
betwe 
en 
fields 
as 
comm 
itmen 
t 
Movement from one to another 
frame of understanding as a 
commitment: for example 
from national to religious or 
socialist identity and frame of 
understanding, or from class to 
national frame 
New values, new 
alliances 
Costs: loss of roots and 
solidarities 
Benefits: gain of new 
resources and allies. 
Situat 
ional 
shifti 
ng 
betwe 
en 
fields 
Situational switching between 
self-presentation as religious, 
political, class, familial, job or 
national categories 
Change in roles 
consistent with 
continuity in 
encompassing values 
Few individual costs 
Much individual benefit 
in situational flexibility. 
Little impact on existing 
schema. 
 
 
 
In societies where there are composite divisions, schema-switching seldom makes a lasting 
difference to boundaries or identities. Rather than competing schema within a particular field, 
contest is built into the categories and rules in use in that field (Hutchinson, 2005). What 
appears as a major shift (for example from a British or Irish to a Northern Irish self-reported 
identity) may simply be a specification of the existing schema; the new category is implicitly 
subsumed within the old ones.16 Shifting between fields has little impact when fields 
interpenetrate and schema are largely homologous. So, as Lybarger (2007) shows in Gaza, his 
respondents’ shift from national Palestinian to religious Islamic schemas changes the 
subjective form, conceptual and moral resources, and potential alliances and resources that 
 
 
16  Most  of  those  who  switch  are  northern  Irish  (within  the  Irish  categorisation)  or Northern  irish  (ie.  A 
regional variant of British), and relatively few are Northern Irish regionalists. For discussion see Hayes and 
McAllister, 2013  70-74    . 
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they can access, but is aligned with the same relation with the Israeli Other, at most modifying 
the grammar of division but not radically changing it. Rather than providing a paradigm shift, 
the national themes are reintegrated into the religious meanings in a reinterpretative process 
that modifies rather than replaces the older division.17 
 
In societies with composite divisions, few categorical schema remain unappropriated. Thus it 
is difficult, in Wimmer’s terminology, to change the topography of division. Cosmopolitan 
values are typically appropriated by imperial states, and often remain tied to particularist 
judgements and used to delegitimize the struggles of dominated groups (see Osterhammel, 
1997; Calhoun, 2007). Labourist and feminist identities are coloured by the ways the division 
of labour and family structure are organized by ethno-national divisions: thus in Northern 
Ireland there have been ‘orange’ and ‘green’ socialists, and republican and state-centred 
feminists while cosmopolitanism has long been used by sections of the unionist elite to argue 
against ‘narrow’ [Irish not British] nationalism (see variously McGarry and O’Leary, 1995 ; 
Ruane and Todd, 1996; Hoewer, 2014 ). 
 
Reinterpretation of the rules, meanings and values associated with a given identity. 
 
Reinterpretation requires considerable discretion of interpretation in the rules and meanings 
surrounding identity categories and negotiability in the practices assumed to follow. The 
empirical types of change discussed here are based on patterns of change that I have found to 
be common in the Irish cases; of course the list is not intended as exhaustive. I distinguish the 
types in terms of change in meaning (incorporating category, grammar, content), and change in 
directionality (incorporating ontology, epistemology, mode of argumentation and values).18 
From this follows the impact - the costs and benefits of each choice and its sustainability in 
different circumstances. 
 
Reinterpretation is carried on by organic intellectuals on behalf of the group, by activists, and 
by ordinary citizens.19 It can take more or less radical forms, potentially subverting the 
authority of official classifications and implicitly changing the meaning and legitimation of 
existing hierarchies. How it proceeds when it meets convergence or resistance from others 
depends as much on the type of innovation as on the type of interaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17  Mitchell and Todd 2007 outline how this occurs in Northern  Ireland when Protestants  dismayed  by the 
perceived  ‘defeat’  of  the  Good  Friday  Agreement  of  1998,  switched  from  a prioritization  of  a national- 
political schema to the prioritization of an evangelical-religious schema and later switched back to a more 
moderate version of the older national-political schema. 
18 While this builds on Todd 2005, there I proposed ideal types while here I outline an empirical typology. 
19  For philosophical  discussion  of the importance  of such  reflexion  upon  particularity  and reintepretation 
based upon it, see Benhabib, 2006; 2011. 
11  
Patterns of Identity Innovation 
 
Table 3: Types of identity innovation: reinterpretative strategies 
 
Types Meaning Directionality Impact 
General 
mechanisms 
Empiri 
cal 
types 
Categories Content/ 
meaning 
Gramma 
r 
Epistemology/o 
ntology/ 
argumentation 
Values Costs and 
benefits, 
Sustainabil 
ity and 
impact 
Reinterpreti 
ng  the  given 
schema 
 
Wide 
discretion of 
interpretiati 
on; low 
authoritative 
ascription. 
Permits 
everyday 
agency and 
bottom up 
change. 
Reaffir 
mation 
Clarifying categories, removing 
ambiguities, emphasising oppositions.  
Removing exceptions, liminality,  
blurred or flexible rules in favour of 
clear and dyadic ones 
Certainty, binary oppositions, 
values of purity, tradition. 
Benefit: Self-esteem, end of 
anxiety 
Cost: conflict. 
Reinte 
rpretat 
ion 
within 
the 
traditi 
on 
Changing the meaning of a given 
tradition, revising it as did Irish 
republicans, Basque nationalists, 
Egyptian youth 
Incremental value change 
from within tradition, using 
modes of argumentation from 
the tradition: 
Part of the process of 
endogenous change, very 
typical of all traditions, all 
social identities. Does not 
immediately impact on inter- 
group relations, but may do 
so over time 
Univer 
salistic 
affirm 
ation 
Retaining identity category, content 
and grammar, but emphasising those 
aspects that  express universal 
values.  USA as the ‘land of the 
free’ . French civic republican 
universalism. 
Defining the universalistic 
essence of the identity 
(republican equality and 
laicite) and using this to 
judge all particular practices 
(wearing of crosses, 
burkinis). 
Costs: difficulty of distilling 
the universal from the 
particular.  Weighting 
towards particular 
perspective. 
Reproduces opposition. 
Benefits:  retaining and 
legitimating valued identity 
and (in best case) improving 
intergroup relations. 
Plurali 
sation 
Category, content and grammar kept 
more or less intact. Emphasising 
inclusive aspects of narrative content 
and compatibility of different 
positions. 
Certainty in the ‘basics’ of 
identity while change at the 
margins. Double set of 
values, pluralist equality, 
mutual respect, and particular 
values of tradition. 
Argumentation  ‘I will 
respect your cultural identity 
and you must respect mine.’ 
Cost: Unstable equilibrium 
where initial opposition 
strong. Open to in-group 
pressure, out-group rejection 
and reversal 
Benefit: Maintains identity 
while improving social 
relations. Strong strategic 
alliances kept. 
Least sustainable where most 
needed. 
Privati 
sation 
Move down to functional role rather 
than type categories, rejection of 
previous categories, content, 
valuation, grammar. 
Values of ‘hard days work’ 
or ‘family life’ 
 
Argumentation often 
consequentialist: ‘national 
identity causes conflict, 
therefore I reject it.’ 
Cost: restricted public 
participation 
Benefit: safety, freedom of 
movement, resilience against 
stigmatisation 
Individually sustainable, little 
chance of spread and liable to 
generational reversal. 
transfo 
rmatio 
n 
Changing content, rules and 
equivalences: rebuilding identity 
boat while sailing in it. Democracy 
(in Dewey’s concept). May end with 
revision of categories themselves, for 
example the South African Rainbow 
Nation. 
Openness, exploration, 
reflexion, autonomy, 
fallibilism . 
Processual values and 
arguments rather than means- 
ends. 
Refusal of closure: non- 
groupist. 
Costs: Marginalisation and 
in-group disapproval 
Benefits: Freedom, 
independence, openness 
Individually sustainable 
given safe niches, 
generationally expansive 
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Reaffirmation 
In this mode, the individual casts aside ambiguities and uncertainties about boundaries, treats 
complex and composite identities as simple essential ones and identifies strongly and 
uncritically with the wider group, giving strong moral justifications of self- and group- stance. 
It is common in situations of protracted conflict, and amongst those who feel a strong sense of 
threat (Bar-Tal 2013; Abulof 2015). Sometimes those who move to such a strong polarizing 
sense of group identity do so while becoming politicized or militarized and one certainly finds 
reaffirmers amongst political and military activists in Northern Ireland (Bosi and de Fazio , 
2017 forthcoming). 
 
It is less clear how far and when this stance is adopted by ordinary citizens. In Northern Ireland, 
I have found that many citizens intermittently sway to support extremist politicians on 
particular policy choices, while retaining much more flexibility in their everyday relations, and 
sometimes swaying back later to more moderate politics. Many are serial swayers – often 
failed pluralisers - rather than committed reaffirmers. 
 
Universalistic affirmation 
Universalistic affirmers find general values in their particular identities. They focus on group- 
specific roots and rights, and the traditional narratives around these, but find within them more 
important human values. Argumentation is on the basis of these values – democracy, justice, 
freedom. Specific judgements do not, however, always escape the particular perspective: so 
for example some advocates of republican laicite take the headscarf (not the cross) as 
problematic, and ban the burkini (not the wetsuit or the beach-dress). 
 
This stance promises at once to retain the valued identity and increase self-esteem, at the same 
time as reaching out to promote better relations. However it is difficult to draw out the 
universalisable from the particularistic aspects of the tradition, particularly where divisions are 
composite, and tempting simply to universalise the particular perspective and thus reproduce 
opposition. Its universalising message may, however, not be vulnerable to in-group pressure 
and out-group rejection. Where divisions are deep and composite, those who undertake this 
project have to transform their identity (cutting links, revising narratives) in the process of 
drawing out its universalistic content. Thus for example reformist evangelicals in Northern 
Ireland emphasise the universal truth of the Bible and cut the traditional linkage between 
Protestant evangelical religion and unionist politics (Mitchell and Ganiel, 2011). 
 
Pluralisation 
Pluralisation is a mode of everyday practice with the aim of peaceful coexistence and mutual 
recognition between existing groups. It keeps much of the given identity – the category, rules 
of reference, content, solidarities – but amends it to allow coexistence and permeability 
between groups, and it sees all existing groups as equally valuable. Thus it resonates with the 
ideology of multi-culturalism. It is guided by a two-levelled value system: the desire to keep 
the particular content of its own tradition together with recognition of the equal value of all 
such particular traditions. It argues for compromise with minimal change in one’s own or 
others’ traditions: one can accept the others as they are. It is common among those striving for 
equality for their group, or those who have recently achieved such equality.20 
 
 
 
20 Thus it is most common in my research amongst nationalists in Northern Ireland. 
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Pluralisation is an attractive option because it promises to keep solidarity and continuity while 
improving relations. Yet it is vulnerable to in-group pressure – since it keeps most of the in- 
group values, shared narratives and grammar – and to out-group rejection of the proffered 
changes. It is most difficult where it is most necessary, in composite divisions where the 
identities are opposed one to another on a range of dimensions, where differing modes of 
interaction are held as normal, where the delineation of the public sphere is in question and 
there is no agreed public frame of what counts as fair and equal change. In such cases mutual 
accommodation may require very significant changes in expectations, practices and values, 
with resentment that the other does not equally change. It is easy to sway back to oppositional 
identities. Indeed pluralists are often ‘swayers’, trying for compromise, failing and 
retrenching, trying again. 
 
Privatisation 
Privatisation promises escape from conflict and division by shrinking the fields of 
engagement to the job, family and leisure activities which are not so charged with opposition. 
It allows escape from some security problems and it gives a certain psychological resilience 
since one no longer identifies with the group stigmatized or the norms to which one may be 
pressured to conform. It is a form of stoicism, practically good when there is little public hope. 
Its arguments are consequentialist: what is important is safety and individual and family 
progression; where religious or national opposition threatens this, the individual opts out. 
Safety is bought, however, at the cost of influence and leverage on public issues. Even more 
important, it leaves little legacy for the next generation. The socially dominant meanings of 
division remain uncriticised and ready to be adopted and the second generation easily slips 
into them. 
 
Transformation 
Transformation reconstitutes divisions by changing radically and without limit their meaning, 
thereby removing justifications for exclusion and changing legitimations of power relations. It 
may qualify the grammar, for example by retelling narratives or changing practices, implicitly 
adding categories and making new distinctions, so that previous dyadic categories (British or 
Irish, Protestant or Catholic) can credibly be said to be conjoinable and old equivalences 
(British = Protestant) are rejected. Through everyday practices it highlights historical 
contingency, deconstructs the composite divisions, refinds lost opportunities and reconstructs 
meaning around them. Above all, transformation is ongoing. It does not remap divisions but 
deconstructs them, and is principledly non-groupist. It is focused on what John Dewey calls 
'ends in view' rather than final resting points, and has much of his 'democratic' aims of freeing 
activity and opening options, rather than accepting isolation and closedness (Dewey, 1916, 86- 
7, 105). It works by what he calls the 'true individualism' of the 'development of agencies for 
revising and transforming previously held beliefs' (Dewey, 1916, 305). Its modes of 
argumentation are iterative, dialogic, without taking any axioms as uncriticisable; it values 
process as much as product. 
 
The process of transformation may be focused primarily on local divisions (Protestant vs 
Catholic in Northern Ireland) or it can move to wider national ones (British vs Irish; European 
vs British), or to global ones (the West vs the rest). It has the aim of overcoming the 
limitations, injustices and power-legacies embodied in the given identity. While in benign 
social circumstances, transformation may be incremental and smoothly accomplished, in 
societies with deep composite divisions it is more likely to be radical and crisis-ridden as 
seemingly core aspects of identity are revised or rejected. 
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Since it criticizes divisions ‘from within’, transformation is seen as subversive and meets with 
strong in-group rejection. It is resilient to collaborative cognition by the in-group, since it has 
rationally reconstructed the grammar and meaning of the identity, but it is vulnerable to 
marginalization and intimidation. It has a major impact on the next generation potentially 
freeing them from the given grammar of division. 
 
 
 
 
This empirical typology makes no claim to be exhaustive. Reinterpretation is creative and 
different conjunctures lead to differently patterned individual choices. Yet even this limited 
typology highlights the parallels and contrasts between identity change in different social 
contexts.21 
 
The typology also helps explain the choice of change. Since each type of innovation involves 
differing degrees of dependence on the in-group and vulnerability to out-group rejection, the 
choice is highly likely to vary with specific stages of struggle and power relations. For 
example, resisting inequality and stigmatisation is likely to demand strong in-group solidarity: 
Lamont et al (2016) have found that appeals to group identity increase social resilience. Such 
movements often adopt pluralist (liberal nationalist) or universal-affirmationist (civil rights) 
claim-making, working from a strong group solidarity and tradition. Once horizontal 
inequality is remedied, however, continuing exclusions and mobilisations of bias by powerful 
institutions of church, state or political party are likely to demand fission rather than fusion, a 
distancing from immediate ‘we’ feeling, a critique of groupness in order to criticise how the 
given group has been constructed. This has been the case in 21st century Ireland, North and 
South. Identity innovation thus becomes a way for individuals to develop their own resources 
to make more effective interventions in a still-divided society (cf Fleming et al, 2012 ). 
 
Identity innovation is not always successful, but its failures are patterned and predictable. When 
it fails, individuals are faced with the knowledge that their aims – the compromise for which 
pluralists hope, or the acceptance of universalisers’ principles – were rejected by others. 
Whether this leads them to more radical self-change, to reaffirmation, or to a living with the 
contradictions between their aims and their achievements, depends crucially on their social 
context and resources, and the ways in which available opportunities are framed politically 
and ideologically. 
 
Identity conflicts and the traps of change 
 
Identity innovation is pervasive in the modern world and it provides a resource for wider 
social change. However obstacles to innovation are easily framed in ‘identity’ terms that feed 
conflict. 
 
Adapting Offe’s (2015) discussion of ‘traps’ – where structural conditions both require reform 
and generate no actors with both capacity and incentive to carry forward the changes 
 
 
 
21  For example, earlier versions of this typology (Todd 2005) have been used to think about identity change 
among medical and academic teams (Albert et al, 2015); in remakings of religious distinctions (Mitchell and 
Ganiel, 2011); in gender mobilisation (Hoewer, 2014); in conflict transformation  practices (Smithey, 2011); 
in struggles against stigmatisation (Lamont and Mizrachi, 2012) 
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necessary – we can define an identity trap as one where the socio-political divisions require 
change, while incentivising actors to adopt modes of identity innovation almost guaranteed to 
fail. Identity traps are set not by identity but by socio-political structures and they vary in their 
tightness, their spatial range (from local to transnational) and the opportunities of escape. In the 
discussion that follows I show how this refocusing of attention away from ‘identities’ to 
identity innovation and the institutional obstacles to it, provides a fruitful perspective for 
understanding the logic of different ‘identity conflicts’, while providing a normative parameter 
for resolving them. 
 
Pluralist traps: refocusing the ‘problem’ of migration in England 
 
Pluralisation is the everyday attempt to reach a fair balance with others where each is equally 
recognised and respected in their values and traditions. But without common normative and 
institutional frames, reversals are inevitable because it is far from clear where the final 
equilibrium is to lie and attempts to reach it are vulnerable to in-group pressure and out-group 
rejection. In England even individuals with good will and belief in fair play tend intermittently 
to be swayed to racist or anti-immigrant statements in focus groups and by the media (Skey, 
2011). The process is exploited by right wing populists (Wodak, 2015). 
 
Political commentary has itself swayed in response, sometimes blaming grass-roots extremists, 
sometimes complacent elites. It is instead necessary to analyse the lack of fit between the aims 
of and the resources for pluralist identity innovation, and the uneven distribution of those 
resources. 
 
Pluralisation is particularly difficult where group identities are strong and are asymmetric. In 
Britain in the past it was possible because the strongest population demographically – ‘the 
English’ – had but a weakly affirmed identity, while other groups and regions with stronger 
‘identities’ could be integrated into English-centred and highly class-stratified institutions.22 
The devolution settlement of 1998, the threat of Scottish independence and most recently 
Brexit have cast this institutional and ideological frame in question, requiring greater 
articulation of the principles underlying state policy. They have also problematized ‘the 
English’: many of Condor’s (2000, 2010) respondents in England in the 2000s were unsure 
how to speak of ‘this country’ (see also Fenton, 2007), and the UKIP ‘English nationalist’ vote 
has risen. 
 
Until recently, tensions associated with migration have been negotiated into a pluralist 
equilibrium through local institutions and practices (Hickman et al, 2012, trace some of the 
successes here). The problem arises when the issues are articulated in general groupist terms. 
To accommodate ‘the Sikhs’ in the police, or ‘the Scots’ in devolution is problematic if large 
tranches of the population are left with no way to include themselves as a claim-makers in 
their own plural and multi-cultural ideals. In consequence in focus-groups ‘the English’ are 
routinely named in an ethnicised and racialised way, even by individuals who explicitly hold 
multi-cultural ideals (Skey, 2011). Thus a vulnerability to racist political rhetoric is 
unsurprising. If pluralist equilibria are to be found, groupism (in ideology and in policy) has to 
be dropped and an agreed frame of political values articulated that will permit accommodation 
between highly asymmetric populations, interests and identities. 
 
 
22  See Kumar 2003 on the importance of the imperial heritage for the non-articulation  of English national 
identity. 
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Cosmopolitan traps: national conflicts 
 
It is sometimes argued that identity conflicts are generated by nationalisms, and indeed by any 
appeals to nationality or the nation. Seeking out nationalist premises, avoiding national tropes, 
eradicating national feelings, is then seen as the key to conflict resolution. This is misguided 
cosmopolitanism. In some cases protracted national conflict is based not on oppositional 
national identity but rather on issues of citizenship and democracy, interest and power. 
Ideological identity politics - cosmopolitanism quite as much as extreme nationalism - 
disguise the issues at stake and encourage zero-sum conflict dynamics. 
 
‘Basque nationalism’ is a case in point. It is often incorrectly seen as more extreme than other 
forms of nationalism. Of course there have been extreme nationalists in the Basque Country, 
in particular in ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) and related organisations. But what needs to be 
explained is why the moderates were unable to maintain a momentum after the 
institutionalisation of autonomy in 1979 and unable to marginalise ETA; why sections of the 
population up to the present continue to be attracted to radical nationalist parties. Almost all of 
the specialist literature shows that this is not because of ‘nationalism’, at least not at the 
popular level. The Basque public have consistently been open to plural and hybrid (Basque 
and Spanish) more than exclusivist (Basque only, or Spanish only) identities (Keating, 2001; 
Peral, 2013). Basques have been more welcoming of immigrants than other parts of Spain (De 
La Calle and Miley, 2008). Although Basque nationalism was articulated as an essentialist and 
racialist nationalism by Arana in the late 19th century, this was transformed into a 
cosmopolitan citizenship-oriented outlook by the mid-century (Mees, 2003). 
 
In fact, Basque nationalism has been a vehicle for a diverse set of commitments and affinities; 
these include a distinctive form of economic and industrial organization along principles of 
subsidiarity. Goikoetxea (2013) has argued that this has been understood as an egalitarian 
concept of consensual democracy; it has met with considerable success and allowed escape 
from the worst effects of austerity after 2008. A key axis of Basque-Spanish conflict then lies 
not in Basque 'ethnicity' or 'nationalism', but rather in a commitment to a particular form of 
‘demos’ and socio-economic organisation and related practices. 
 
Herein lies the identity trap, not for Basques but for Spanish centrists. Following Goikoetxea’s 
analysis, the centrist Spanish grammar of nationality (part-defined by the 1978 Constitution) 
differentiates economic and social policy from nationality and nationalism, and thus does not 
allow the Basque position to be comprehensible. In effect, the rules of public discourse tend to 
silence Basque interests and arguments, or force them to be articulated in nationalist form. 
Centrist appeals to universalism, citizenship orientation and away from narrow nationalism are 
thus bound to be counter-productive: it is the form not the fact of citizenship that is at issue. In 
this case, the ‘traps’ that preclude resolution lie at the state and European level: they hinder 
elites from finding adequately creative concepts of citizenship and economic ordering. 
Appeals to cosmopolitanism serve simply to legitimate this failure. 
 
Border conflicts 
 
Great power interests, imperial conquests and partitions have created state borders that confine 
some populations in situations that they would not have chosen. There is now a sophisticated 
literature on the transborder logics of conflict in such cases, focussing largely on national 
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frames and state interests. 23  This literature shows causal mechanisms at work, but it gives 
little analytic handle on the relative justifications of the respective claims. A refocus of 
attention from national affinities to the prospects of identity innovation allows us to see why 
the cases are so different, why they are sometimes so hard to resolve, and gives parameters for 
dialogic change. 
 
Not all claims for transborder arrangements or border change are morally equivalent. If in 
some cases the claims appear little more than ploys of extreme nationalists (Baubock, 2010), in 
others the intent seems rather to unlock complex conflicts and to moderate extreme views 
(Todd, 2011). International law draws a single moral line: only in colonial situations is there a 
right to secession. Yet there is an arbitrariness in this ruling, since where colonial situations 
begin and end is contested and fuzzy (Lustick, 1993 ; Ruane, 1992 ). If, however, we reframe 
the analysis from identity (of co-nationals) to identity innovation and the traps that prevent it, 
we open the discursive field to a set of non-nationalist arguments on the politics of borders, 
thus creating space for substantive dialogue on these questions. 
 
From this perspective, a claim for trans-border institutions or border change based simply on 
given national cultures, identities and affinities is a weak claim. A stronger argument is given 
by showing that change unlocks traps and facilitates identity innovation away from exclusivist 
identities. This leaves open for substantive dialogue and debate (which may itself stimulate 
further identity innovation) how better arrangements may be devised. 
 
To take identity innovation (away from divisive and closed identities) as one normative 
parameter for debate is to break with identity politics. It is to take as an axiom that the identity 
status quo cannot, and in cases of conflict should not, continue.24 It does not presume that all 
change is good, nor does it presume that change towards openness on one dimension is good if 
it leads to closure on another. But it has the benefit of leaving to individuals in the conflict 
region to find the optimal mode of innovation from their particular situation. It does not 
impose one route for example universalization within the existing state, nor does it preclude an 
emphasis on national or religious particularity, but it invites the actors to argue for institutional 
change that would help open their own perspectives to more dialogue, without constraining the 
equal potential of others. 
 
This very simple parameter of debate confirms the general intuitions that border change is 
justified in colonial situations. Colonial situations – even after the worst colonial exploitation 
has ended - tend to produce high levels of cultural inequality in which universalistic arguments 
are monopolized by the ‘colonists’ who use them to assert their superior status and rights. This 
leaves the ‘natives’ with little potential of asserting their equal status with the colonists or 
offering an egalitarian mode of cultural coexistence. In such circumstances there are very 
strong arguments that secession (from the imperial realm) may be the only way to make future 
equal coexistence possible. The colonists do not have an equal and opposite argument for the 
status quo. Indeed rather than decolonization precluding them from changing towards 
coexistence, it may be the best way to incentivize such change. There are other non- colonial 
cases where there are compelling non-nationalist reasons for trans-border institutions 
 
 
 
23 Brubaker, 1996; Beissinger, 2002. 
24 As always there is an 'other things equal' caveat. Thus this should not be taken to delegitimate the appeal to 
group identity as one of the few available resources in the struggle against inequality, although as discussed 
above this appeal is often framed in innovatory (pluralist, universalist) forms. 
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or even border change, in order to provide an open and equal arena for further change through 
dialogue.25 Conversely, it is highly unlikely that these parameters would provide strong 
arguments for minority irredentist nationalisms in Eastern Europe (see Baubock, 2010). 
 
There are also cases where the lack of options for one party in the existing situation is matched 
by a lack of options for the other in any likely alternative but in the examples given in the 
literature, these traps are eminently political. 26 
 
Conclusion 
 
Everyday identity innovation plays a weak emancipatory role. It is weak because it has no 
force against violence, power and marginalisation, but it remains the only way that power 
change can become transformational. In benign circumstances, identity innovation can be 
undertaken in a multiplicity of ways, with a thousand different routes to get to better and more 
permeable relationships. But not every mode of change is sustainable from every social 
position. In societies with composite embedded divisions, individual innovation has to be 
radical, transformative, if it is to survive. Often individuals who change have to bide their 
time, find niches where they can sustain alternative perspectives, until real prospects of wider 
social change emerge. 
 
This has immediate policy implications for conflict situations. Often it is argued that identity 
change – in the sense of change of ethnic or national identity categories – is rare and not to be 
anticipated. Even if this is true, identity change in the sense of change in the meaning, 
permeability and salience of the received categories is highly likely, including in conflict 
situations. Part of what state and international policy initiatives can do is to remove the traps 
that tend to reverse innovation and to marginalise the individuals who innovate, creating more 
social niches where innovation can be sustained and grow in safety. 
 
Even more, policy makers should reject their own common sense assumptions that their 
cosmopolitan or multi-culturalist perspectives can be imposed upon locals. This is not to posit 
a cultural relativism that uncritically accepts (oppositional) local ethnic identities. Rather it is 
to argue that not all national and cultural arguments are equal: some do and some don’t express 
genuine and widely acceptable aims and values of autonomous development and mutual 
respect; some do and some don’t point the way towards reciprocal innovation. Policy should 
work with the grain of everyday change, introducing new repertoires and institutional 
resources for those working for change. 
 
I have set out some common types of innovation, and the predictable obstacles that they meet. 
Where social transformation happens, it is a conjuncture of processes of different temporality: 
niches of individuals who have changed, with ripple and exemplary effects; structural 
opportunities for wider social change; delegitimation of old ideologies and leaders, so that new 
 
 
 
 
25 For Northern Ireland, see Ruane and Todd 1996, 2007. 
26 What Abulof (2015) calls ‘small peoples’ open to such ontological insecurity become so, on his own account, 
when there is no evident way for them to transmute, adapt, fuse or split while maintaining continuity in and 
through identity innovation: Afrikaners for whom a path became  available innovated, Israelis for whom paths 
appeared closed did not. 
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projects can take root. If this culminates in a cascade of change, it is made possible by slower 
incremental processes, including processes of individual identity innovation. 
 
To emphasise identity innovation is to highlight the weak emancipatory power of individuals- 
in-interdependence, the potential to use one’s given heritage – national, religious, class – to 
progressive purposes by reinterpreting it, finding its positive potential, clarifying what has to 
be left behind and why. That is an old aim, implicit in art and literature.27 Everyday identity 
innovation has some of that creative and emancipatory potential. That it usually fails does not 
take away from its value. 
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